Financial contagion and systemic risk of global financial system: from theory to applicable macroeconomic model

Definition of financial contagions
What is financial contagion? And why is it correlated with the systemic risk of global financial system? How can we exactly measure and define such an intangible entity? What statistical and mathematical methods can we use to measure susceptibility of global financial system to inner and outer shocks? There are no clear straightforward answers to these ambiguous questions. Nevertheless it is worth trying to do it by employing vast arrays of empiric and theoretical literature on this topic.
Kolb (2010) 2 advises that we should first of all consider the very nature of the metaphor used to describe this phenomenon. We should be fully aware of the fact that such notions as "epidemic" (which refers to financial crisis) and "contagion" are quite different. Not all crises or epidemics may be due to contagion. The main fundamental reason of contagion is the mechanism of transmission of contagion from one financial institution to another. Anticipating the following literature, it is worth noting that the vast majority of researchers in fact analyse the consequences of contagion, i.e. they study various episodes of increased correlation of financial indicators. Such an approach may provide us with a useful to tool for identifying contagious episodes post factum but it remains unclear what underlying mechanisms are involved.
Let us return to the very notion of financial contagion. Different economists have various ideas about definition of contagion:
1. "The theory is that small shocks impacting several institutions or sectors are then spread to the whole financial sector of economy by means of contagion 3 ";
2. "The spread of problems in financial sphere from one economy to another in one region or globally, which can be called contagion 4 "; Some provide more complex definitions of contagion:
1. Increase in probability of crisis in one country due to occurrence of crisis in other countries;
2. "Spill over" of volatility from one country to another; 3. Contagion occurs when correlated stock price movements cannot be explained by fundamentals;
4. Contagion is a significant increase in covariance between prices and volumes in different markets, which happens as a result of crisis;
5. Contagion occurs when transmission channel is amplified after a shock on one of markets.
For some researchers the speed of contagion is what matters. But for the majority of economists the very notion of contagion is equivalent to increase in correlation between studied markets. There are several specific concerns:
1. As a rule, during crises volatility is usually seen to rise which causes increase in correlations. Therefore researchers employ sophisticated econometric and statistic apparatus;
2. The correlation level must be higher "than is explained by the fundamentals" of "than was expected"; 3. Lack of proper proof of contagion (i.e. stable high correlation) is interpreted as interdependence;
Channels of contagion
It is useful to know during which episodes (the majority of researchers agree that contagion took place during Asian financial crisis and the crisis of 2007-2008) took place and to have certain metrics to track it. But in order to shape sensible counteraction policy we are to know the mechanisms of transmission, which can possibly act as means of contagion. We can even point to one popular metaphor 5 : "when America sits in a draught, the rest of the world catches cold". The following channels are widely agreed to be applicable in this case:
 Trade (during crisis import of the affected country can decrease impacting the rest of the world);
 Direct and portfolio investment;
 International liabilities between (or "balance sheet effect", we can actually extend B. Bernanke's financial accelerator theory to international scale 6 );
 The existence of marked to market assets on the balance sheets of banks may lead to fire price sales during crises, which may result in capital deficiency.
Margin calls may also be an issue;
 Change in the perception mechanism of investors, i.e. so called wake-up calls when unanticipated negative events changes investors' outlook. Also sometimes investors are known to treat all emerging economies as the whole, which influences their judgment heavily;  Significant uncertainty issues, unreliability of conventional statistical and mathematical methods during turbulence periods;
The first three channels are quite fundamental (also trade and BOP have long and reliable series of data). These fundamental connection channels can be analysed using network models and calculation widely accepted network metrics. This was done extensively only for trade network.
Correlation analysis of contagion
The bulk part of research dedicated to contagion is based on correlation metrics.
They usually do not dwell on analysing the channels of transmission.
In particular researchers from Bank of Italy 7 summarize a few useful stylized facts about financial crises and contagion:
 Drastic asset price changes affect clusters of countries;
 Volatility of asset yields is higher during crises;
 During crises covariance of asset yields is known to rise within one country;  Correlations between assets from different countries also rise; 6 
Network analysis of contagion
All the aforementioned usually refers to analysing financial contagion indirectly, i.e. analysing its symptoms. If we continue to use the contagion metaphor, then we need not only to only to identify the infection and its epicentre, but also invent a means of preventing such infections in future. Therefore we will turn to more fundamental disease spread channels. As discussed before we take the following channels into consideration:
 Capital account; 10 Kleimeier, S., T. Lehnert, and W. 
 Bank liabilities;
Detailed analysis is usually conducted using network models. Kubelec mathematical modelling in order to show that higher capital ratio decreases probability of default in banking system in a non-linear fashion. Researchers generate hypothetic banking network using mathematical modelling and then subject it to outer shocks. If shock is smaller than equity capital of the bank then it's absorbed. If the shock is bigger, then it is transmitted to other banks and depositors, which can cause further amplification.
Probability of bank default also depends on the foreign claims ratio (which varies from 15% to 30%). It reaches maximum when this ratio is about 30% and then is stable. The link between the number of nodes in the network (i.e. how full the network is) and the number of defaults is m-shaped. It means that there are few defaults in case of little connections and few defaults in case of abundant connections. The most useful about this paper is its approach for modelling banking networks, shock absorption and transmission mechanisms. This will be adopted by us empirically in future.
Fagiolo, Reyses and Shiavo (2010) 12 provide a significant contribution by analysing world trade network. Their findings include:
 Network has core-periphery structure;
 Major role is played by OECD countries;
 The structure of the network is quite stable and is not susceptible to systemic shocks;
 High involvement in trade network increases the probability of stock market shock during crisis events.
But the most interesting contribution is provided in IMF paper by Minoiu and Reyes (2011) 13 It is also interesting that in a recent paper by Stolbov (2012) 14 the existence of credit cycles in global economy is also confirmed using quite different statistical and mathematical apparatus.
The main interest is behaviour of GBN during crises. Take a look at the figure Analysis is finalized with dummy-based regression model showing that credit is significantly rationed during crisis periods.
Other methods
Analysis of systemic risk is a separate and broad issue in the literature. By definition systemic risk is a situation when there is a probability that a series of connected defaults in the financial system happening during a short time period can decrease liquidity and result in confidence loss. "Systemic crisis can be defined as a systemic event, which influences many financial institutions undermining normal functioning of the financial system. While the special nature of banking institutions plays its role, systemic risk is something more than banks' vulnerability to runs. The notion of financial contagion lies at the root of this concept. In this case contagion means significant spill over of losses from one institution or market to another." The main pillars of systemic risk are leverage and linkages. Leverage acts as a magnifying glass, which enlarges losses during adverse market conditions. As financial companies usually have only limited amount of equity capital, they have to sell assets during crises which causes negative feedback loops. Also assets of financial institutions may be quite illiquid (i.e. hedge funds) and lack stable market valuation, which in its turn aggravates the situation. Also the depth of crisis may depend on how asset price is susceptible to market conditions and how companies are interlinked.
In practice data on mutual debt exposures turns out to be proprietary and inaccessible to regulators in most of cases. Therefore systemic risk analysis is frequently conducted using indirect measures. Indirect systemic risk analysis may be useful for crisis prevention if it is based on relevant data. Thus, researchers employ market data assuming that market valuation should react quickly to adverse market conditions. In any case, if financial companies provided such data to regulators, it could be doubted that regulators would act efficiently. In this case we can remember about criticism towards recent Dodd-Frank law 17 .
Researchers note that they chose these types of financial institutions deliberately taking into consideration the changes the global financial system underwent recently.
Literature on systemic risk can be divided in several broad categories. It is also worth noting that causality links between 100 top institutions from 4 sectors were analysed. Researchers found that the number of statistically significant links between institutions rose from 6% to 14% (of maximal number of links). Also figure 7 depicts a major change in causality relations in the last decade. 
Sketch of applicable macroeconomic model of contagion
The following model of systemic risk and contagion in global financial system (GFS) is to be implemented. It owes its main building blocks to the above literature. It was decided to limit our analysis solely to banking sector and exclude trade and capital movements. Key premises for such decision are the following:
 BIS collects detailed data on banking systems of various countries on unified basis;
 Such banking network is described in literature in detail;
 Central banks provide consolidated balance sheets of their banking systems;
 Researchers point out that banks play pivotal yet not overwhelming role in crises;
 Data on connection and assets of banking systems allows us to validate the potential "threat" and "cushion" to mitigate this threat;
 When current or capital account poses threat to GDP in the long term it is less clear how "cushion" mechanism works;
 Banking data is more frequent (quarterly) and can serve in theory as leading indicator;  Author's limited capabilities.
Ideologically the model will look as follows:
 Using data of central banks we construct stylized consolidated banking balances (main entries are equity, foreign assets/liabilities, deposits);
 BIS network data is added;
 Also balance sheets of top 3 largest institutions per country can be added to analysis;
 Fragmentation of banking system can be evaluated using concentration metrics (HHI, CR3 etc);
 We take the assumption that foreign shock occur due to the fact that financial links between countries' banks die out during crises causing losses (now "candidates" are Spain, Portugal and Greece);
 Such shocks are first cushioned using equity capital, then using international assets (which may cause secondary induced defaults and shocks) and only then using deposits;
 Model including balance sheets and network will be subjected to shock via mathematical modeling;
In perfect world such model can be a useful applied instrument to spot problem financial zones and evaluate consequences of financial turmoil. The analysis of systemic risk and financial contagion is a relatively new and developing topic. Usually different statistical and mathematical methods are applied, but researchers agree on one thing: we require adequate and timely methods to monitor financial system in order to react on mounting fragility in the system. Also we believe that in the modern world, to which very intertwined financial system is inherent, such analysis should become mainstream. But in this case we are to develop simple and intuitively understandable instruments. It is obvious that systems of simultaneous GARCH equations are not easy understood by the public. Therefore we will also try to develop such an instrument and make it accessible via the Internet.
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